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There is a widespread impression among the Indian intelligentsia, foreign scholars, and 
residents of developed/rich countries that India’s economic growth has not reduced poverty, 
that globalisation has worsened poverty and/or income distribution, and that there are hundreds 
of millions of hungry people in India.  These arguments are buttressed by recourse to India’s 
ranking on several social indicators.  Esoteric debates about the comparability of survey data 
and gaps between NSS and NAS add to the confusion and allow ideologues to believe and 
assert whatever information suits the argument.  What are the basic facts about poverty, 
income distributions, and hunger at an aggregate level?  This paper reviews the available data 
and debates on this subject and comes to a commonsense view.  It then tries to link some of the 
outcomes to the policy framework and programmes of the government. The paper finds that 
India’s poverty ratio of around 22 percent in 1999-2000 is in line with that observed in countries at 
similar levels of per capita income.  The ratio is relatively high because India is a relatively poor/ 
low-income country, i.e., with low average income.  90 percent of the countries in the world have a 
higher per capita (average) income than India.  The number of the poor is very high because India’s 
population is very large, the second-highest in the world.  India’s income distribution as measured by 
the Gini co-efficient is better than three-fourths of the countries of the world.  The consumption share 
of the poorest 10 percent of the population is the sixth best in the world. 
Where India has failed as a nation is in improving its basic social indicators like literacy 
and mortality rates.  Much of the failure is a legacy of the three decades of Indian socialism 
(till 1979-80).  The rate of improvement of most indicators has accelerated during the market 
period (starting in 1980-81).  The gap between its level and that of global benchmarks is still 
wide and its global ranking on most of these social parameters remains very poor.  This is the 
result of government failure. The improvement in social indicators has not kept pace with 
economic growth and poverty decline, and this has led to increasing interstate disparities in 
growth and poverty. 
 
JEL classification:  I3, I32, I38 
Keywords:  Hunger, Poverty, Public Goods, Public and Quasi-Public Goods and 
Services, Basic Education, Public Health, Sanitation 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a widespread impression among the Indian intelligentsia, foreign scholars, 
and residents of developed/rich countries that India’s economic growth has not reduced 
poverty, that globalisation has worsened poverty and/or income distribution, and that 
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there are hundreds of millions of hungry people in India.  These arguments are buttressed 
by recourse to India’s ranking on several social indicators.  Esoteric debates about the 
comparability of survey data and gaps between NSS and NAS add to the confusion and 
allow ideologues to believe and assert whatever information suits the argument.   What 
are the basic facts about poverty, income distribution, and hunger at an aggregate level?  
This paper reviews the available data and debates on this subject and comes to a 
commonsense view.  It then tries to link some of the outcomes to the policy framework 
and programmes of the government.  
The next section presents data on the consumption distribution.  Sections 3 to 6 
look at the issue of poverty from different perspectives.  Section 3 looks at broad 
historical trends, Section 4 examines the linkage between aggregate poverty and per 
capita consumption.  Section 5 tackles the contentious issue of poverty in 1999-2000. 
Section 6 ranks India’s poverty and income distributions from a global perspective.  The 
next two sections deal with other dimensions of poverty, besides income/consumption.  
Section 7 presents the facts about hunger in India and Section 8 about social indicators 
like health and literacy. Section 9 analyses their linkage to government policy and 
programmes. The broad theme that emerges is that the failures on this front, apart from 
the indirect effects of growth, are linked directly to the failure of governance.   This 
failure has many dimensions; the misallocation of government resources, the failure to 
follow norms of social benefit-cost analysis that were the reason de tar for the 
introduction of national planning, the neglect of public and quasi-public goods that are 
the most fundamental justification for the existence of government and a gradual (over 
decades) but progressive deterioration in the quality of governance. This conclusion 
differs radically from the conventional wisdom (national and international) about India’s 
poverty, social indicators and income distribution.  Even if treated as a hypothesis it 
merits debate and further analysis. 
Section 10 proposes a radical solution to the problem of hunger and poverty.  
Section 11 summarises the conclusions of the paper. 
 
2.  CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION 
A reasonably standardised large sample consumption survey has been carried out 
every five years by the National Sample Survey Organisation since 1972-73 (the earlier 
surveys are not strictly comparable). Based on these surveys a consistent series for the 
consumption distribution can be constructed.  This is shown in Table 1.  If we ignore the 
1977-78 data for the moment, we find a noteworthy result.  The rural income distribution 
has improved progressively (but very gradually) from 1972-73 to 1999-2000 and this can 
be seen at every level.  Thus for instance the share of the poorest 10 percent, which was 
3.7 percent in 1972-73 increased to 3.8 percent by 1983, to 4.3 percent in 1987-88 to 
1993-94 and to 4.4 percent in 1999-2000. The same pattern is found at every level of 
cummulation (Technically there is “Stochastic Dominance”). Thus the new situation is 
Pareto superior to the earlier one, reducing the importance of measure such as the ‘Gini’ 
coefficient.   
Another way to look at the result is from the perspective of the eighties and 
nineties. In this case 1977-78 constitutes the situation prior to the start of the         
eighties.  Therefore ignoring 1972-73 we again find that the consumption distribution has  
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Table 1 
Rural Consumption Distribution (NSS 30 Day Recall) 
 Cumulative Percentage of Rural Persons Poverty 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% HCR (%) 
Year Cumulative Consumption Distribution Rural Total 
1972-73 3.7% 8.9% 15.0% 22.0% 30.1% 38.7% 49.1% 60.5% 74.8% 100% 56.5 54.9 
1977-78 3.5% 8.4% 14.3% 20.8% 28.4% 36.7% 46.2% 57.6% 71.7% 100% 53.1 51.3 
1983 3.8% 9.0% 15.2% 22.1% 30.2% 39.2% 49.2% 60.9% 75.5% 100% 45.6 44.7 
1987-88 4.1% 9.5% 15.8% 22.9% 30.7% 39.7% 49.6% 61.5% 74.7% 100% 39.1 38.6 
1993-94 4.1% 9.6% 16.0% 23.1% 31.1% 40.0% 50.1% 61.7% 75.8% 100% 37.3 36.2 
1999-00 4.4% 10.1% 16.7% 24.1% 32.8% 41.9% 52.1% 63.8% 77.8% 100% 27.1 26.2 
Source:  P. D. Joshi, “Changing Pattern of Consumption Expenditure in India and some selected States”, 
Sarvekshna Analytical Report No. 2 (July 1998) and NSS. 
 
improved continuously (though very gradually) during the eighties and the nineties.  Each 
rural consumption distribution during the eighties stochastically dominates the previous 
distribution based on large sample surveys. In common parlance citizens at every level of 
income have shared in the fruits of growth since 1980-81. 
The results for the national total (rural cum urban areas together) are shown in 
Table 2.  These results confirm that the consumption distribution has improved over the 
eighties and nineties.  Every cumulative consumption distribution during the eighties and 
nineties (except 1987-88) stochastically dominates the previous distribution.  The only 
ambiguity is in 1987-88 where stochastic dominance fails at the 50th percentile vis-à-vis 
the 1983 distribution.  Even this distribution however dominates the 1977-78 one. The 
consumption distribution has unambiguously improved during the nineties.  The 
anomalies arise because the urban distribution is not unidirectional, dependent as it is on 
the migration from surrounding rural areas (push and pull factors). 
 
Table 2 
National/Total Consumption Distribution 
Cumulative Percentage of Persons 
  10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Year Cumulative Consumption Distribution (%) Gini 
1977-78 3.3% 8.1% 13.8% 20.2% 27.5% 35.9% 45.4% 56.7% 71.0% 100% 34.7 
1983 3.5% 8.4% 14.3% 20.9% 28.5% 37.1% 47.0% 58.6% 73.2% 100% 32.5 
1987-88 3.7% 8.6% 14.4% 21.0% 28.4% 36.8% 46.5% 57.9% 72.5% 100% 32.9 
1993-94 3.7% 8.7% 14.5% 21.2% 28.7% 37.1% 46.8% 58.2% 72.7% 100% 32.5 
1999-00 3.9% 8.9% 14.8% 21.5% 29.0% 37.4% 47.1% 58.6% 73.1% 100% 32.0 
Source: Bhalla (2003a) background tables.         
 
The Kuznets curve hypothesis asserted that income distribution is likely to follow an 
inverted U shaped pattern as per capita income grows from very low levels to high levels. As 
early studies were based on cross-country evidence they do not demonstrate anything about the 
Kuznets hypothesis.  Lindert and Williamson (1985), Denninger and Squire (1998) and 
Lundberg and Squire (2003) do not find any evidence to support the hypothesis. Consistent with 
this finding and in contrast to the Kuznets hypothesis, the Indian Gini (as per the World Bank 
series) has followed a declining trend over the first two and half decades.  During the eighties 
and nineties the above data shows that the distribution has improved gradually but slowly.1 
 
1However, the upward trend is not statistically significant, i.e., it is an L-shaped pattern.  
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3.  POVERTY TRENDS 
There are numerous controversies regarding the measurement of poverty.  The 
most important one relates to the adjustment of individual consumption levels as derived 
from a survey, by the ratio of the per capita consumption from the National account 
statistics to the survey mean for the same item. Such an adjustment leaves the distribution 
of consumption unaffected while changing the calculated poverty rate. Before 1993 such 
an adjustment was routinely made in calculating poverty rates, after 1993 it has been 
discontinued.  The World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandums for India however 
introduced the change in methodology several years earlier. We were critical of the 
change in methodology by the World Bank and the Planning Commission and continue to 
believe that an adjustment of the survey mean is necessary to get a true picture of the 
poverty rates.2 The World Bank’s series covers the entire period from the 1950s on a 
consistent basis and is therefore essential for finding out what happened in phase I as well 
as for comparing poverty in the two phases.3 
The 3rd order polynomial trend line fitted to the World Bank poverty data (Figure 
1) shows that poverty increased during the fifties and sixties.  This happened despite the 
fact that per capita GDP grew at a trend rate of between 1 percent and 2 percent per 
annum through out these two decades. The increase in poverty therefore coincided with a 
declining rate of growth of per capita income and private consumption. This contradicts 
the picture of the Golden age of Independence under the Fabian Socialist policies of the 
first Prime Minister Nehru that many development economists have.4   
Since the early seventies, poverty has been on a clear down trend according to all 
series.  The official poverty calculations based on large sample surveys (Figure 1) shows 
a steeper decline in poverty (especially in the nineties) than the World Bank series.5 The 
declining trend in poverty rate therefore coincided with an acceleration in the trend 
growth of per capita GDP and TFPG from the mid-1970s.  
 
Fig. 1. Poverty as Measured by the Head Count Ratio 
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2In personal discussions with the author(s) of the WB CEMs and in internal notes in the Planning 
Commission respectively. The ratio has increased over time [Bhalla (2003)]. 
3The only other such series is by Bhalla (2003). 
4The Bhalla (2003) series in contrast shows a decline in poverty during the two decades. 
5The Bhalla (2003) series shows an even steeper decline. 
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4.  POVERTY AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
We can also use the survey data to determine the relationship between the national 
poverty rate derived from the survey and the all average all India per capita GDP as 
calculated from the survey.  This helps us skirt/avoid the controversies arising from the 
discrepancies between NSS and NAS consumption data and differing judgement about 
which is superior for what purpose.  As both the poverty rates and the average 
consumption are derived from the same data set, this yields a consistent picture of the 
evolution of poverty rates over time as well as its relationship to average consumption.  
As official poverty rates are not available for early decades we use the World Bank 
poverty and average consumption data from 1950 to 1999.  
It is clear from Figure 2 that there is a linear relationship between aggregate 
poverty and average consumption.6  A one Rupee increase in average real monthly 
consumption expenditure raises 1 percent of the population above the poverty line.  This 
implies that in India, given our democratic political system, in which the poor are fully 
represented, growth of aggregate income/consumption is a sufficient condition for the 
reduction of poverty. 
 
Fig. 2. Per Capita Expenditure and Poverty 
(World Bank Data-1950 to 2000) 
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5.  POVERTY IN 1999-2000 
The most recent controversy regarding poverty estimates relates to the manner in 
which the data was collected in the 1999-2000 survey.  Briefly there are three categories 
of goods in the consumption surveys: Food products that are purchased frequently 
(daily/weekly), semi-durable goods that are purchased with moderate frequency 
(monthly/quarterly) and durable goods that are purchased occasionally (annual/biannual 
or less).  To obtain optimal recall it would be appear to be best to use the 7 day recall 
period for the first category, 30 day for the second and 365 day for the last.  The National 
sample surveys have been rightly experimenting with these periods, but perhaps without 
giving due regard to the implications for comparability of poverty estimates over time.  In 
the 1999-2000 survey, for the first time the same set of households were asked to give 
 
6The R2 is 0.93. The 2nd order polynomial, implying a smaller impact of consumption growth in the 
early decades and a larger impact in recent decades, has an R2 of 0.97. 
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their food consumption for 7 days and 30 days, thus making it non-comparable with 
earlier periods when only the 30 day question was asked.7 It was subsequently discovered 
that there was another source of non-comparability. The use of the 365 day recall period 
for a sub-set of commodities in 1999-2000, whereas the 30 day recall was used for these 
commodities earlier.8  Different scholars have tried to make adjustments and re-calculate 
the poverty rate (Head count ratio), based on the official methodology. According to 
these the poverty rate was between 26.1 percent and 28.5 percent in India in 1999-2000 
(Table below).  
 
 HCR in 1999-2000 
 Total Rural Urban 
Planning Commission 26.1 27.1 23.6   
Sundaram and Tendulkar 27.3 28.9 23.1 
Sen (Abhijit) and Himanshu 27.8 28.8 25.1 
Angus Deaton 28.5 30.0 24.7 
 
It is useful to note the other estimates that have been made using other 
methodologies.  Deaton and Dreze (2002) have estimated a Poverty rate of 22.2 percent 
(26.28 percent rural and 12 percent urban) based on better measures of rural-urban cost of 
living differences and more accurate poverty lines based on better price indices.  Bhalla 
(2003a) has estimated a poverty level of 12-13 percent based on the consumption 
distribution prevailing in 1983 and measures of increase in the income of the poorest 
based on real wage increases from NSS surveys and other sources.9  Bhalla’s (2003) 
estimates for poverty in 1999-2000 (1993) is 6 percent (15 percent) when based on an 
appropriate adjustment of the gap between survey mean consumption and average 
consumption as per NAS.10  Quah (2002) has also estimated Indian poverty using a $2 
per day poverty line to be 12 percent-19 percent for 1992.11  The World Bank however 
estimates a $1 (PPP) a day based poverty rate of 35.3 percent for India in 1993.  Our 
calculations suggest that the $ a day line, which was $1.08 international in 1993 is equal 
to $1.2 in 1999.  India’s national poverty line (rural-urban average) was $1.48 at India’s 
PPP exchange rate of Rs 8.17 per International $ in 1999.  The poverty rate based on 
dollar a day should therefore be lower than that based on the National poverty line, 
whereas the World Bank’s estimate of 35.3 percent for the former is much higher than the 
28.6 percent for the latter.12  The World Bank estimate of the poverty rate based on $ a 
day poverty line is therefore not credible. 
Deaton and Dreze’s (2002) estimate of a poverty rate of 22.2 percent in 1999-
2000, falls in between that of Bhalla and the conventional ones.  From a global 
 
7K. L. Datta’s forthcoming  ICRIER Working paper goes into all the complications and problems. 
8The 1993-94 survey however had also collected data for 365 day recall for these sub-set of 
commodities, but stored it in the archives.  
9Bhalla (2003) estimates a poverty rate of 5.7 percent for 1999 by adjusting for the gap between NAS 
and NSS average consumption. 
10Based on an Indian poverty line equal to PPP $1.25 per capita per day at 1993 prices.  This first 
appeared in 2000 book edited by Govinda Rao. 
11His estimate of poverty for China for 1992 using the same poverty line is 14 percent to 17 percent. 
12The reason seems to be that two different people have made the estimates at different points, perhaps 
based on different methodology! 
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comparative perspective, a small empirical exercise based on WDI (WB) data for 
national poverty rates, per capita GDP, and share of the bottom 20 percent of the 
population suggests a poverty rate of 21.7 percent for India in 1999.13  
The issue raised by Bhalla (2003, 2003a) about the inconsistencies that arise when the 
conventional approach is used, has not been adequately answered by experts who defend the 
conventional approach.  Thus his method of using NSS agricultural wage data (average 
growth 2.5 percent) to adjust for understatement of NSS consumption (average growth 0.8 
percent) is credible.  This adjustment however, requires an assumption of zero net saving by 
the poor (or no change in the saving rate), that may be only partially valid.  The poor, 
particularly those pushed into poverty because of health reasons are likely to be net dis-savers 
(by drawing down their assets). This net dies-saving is likely to decline with average income 
of the poor and the vulnerable.14  Therefore we conclude that the poverty rate for India in 
1999-2000 was between 12 percent and 22 percent. 
What is likely to happen to Poverty assuming that the growth rate of per capita 
GDP (about 3.8 percent per annum) and the rate of decline of poverty maintain the 
average rate seen in that period?  Since 1980-81, poverty has declined at a rate of 0.92 
percent points per annum according to the World Bank estimates and at the rate of 1.17 
percent point per annum according to official data.15  Given the assumption of the future 
evolution of per capita GDP and its relationship to poverty reduction these imply that 
poverty would be eliminated by 2030 and 2021 respectively.  If we take the Deaton-
Dreze estimate of 22.2 percent in 1999 and the corresponding rate of decline of 1.08 
percent point per annum (since 1987), then poverty in India would be eliminated by 2020, 
when India would be a Middle Income Country.16 
 
6.  GLOBAL COMPARISON: AN EQUAL SOCIETY 
India is still a low income country. Its per capita GDP measured at purchasing 
power parity is in the 33rd percentile i.e. 33 percent of the countries in the World have a 
lower per capita income then us (Table 3).  A more realistic comparison is however with 
the medium-large countries defined as those with 2003 GDP at PPP greater than or equal 
to $ 15 billion.  For this set of countries India is in the 23rd percentile i.e. only about 
1/4th of medium-large countries are poorer than us, 3/4th of them are richer.  The 
position has improved considerably since 1980 when we were in the 16th percentile of all 
countries and the 10th percentile for medium-large countries. 
Poor countries generally have higher rates of poverty.  We should therefore not be 
surprised  to  find  a relatively high poverty rate in India compared to better off countries.   
 
13We find about 20 country-data points which have a per capita GDP in (2000 prices) between $2224 
and $3874 (India is $2362) as well as an estimate of HCR ratio and income/consumption share of bottom 20 
percent. Assuming that these are all based on conventional methodology, HCR is regressed on the per capita 
GDP and share of bottom 20 percent.  The estimated equation is used to obtain the predicted value for India. 
14For instance if consumption of the poor falls from 1.2 times income to 1 times over 16 years, a rate of 
growth of income of 2.5 percent (2.9 percent) per annum would be reduced to a consumption growth rate of 1.3 
percent (1.7 percent) per annum.  
15To determine the rate of decline during 1980-81 to 1999-2000 we have taken the average of the 
decline from 1987 to 1999 and from 1983 to 1999. For WB these are 0.94 percent and 0.90 percent and for PC 
1.2 percent and 1.14 percent. 
16In between a lower (LMIC) and upper middle income country (UMIC), a category that has been removed 
from the WB classification scheme. According to our projections India will become an LIMC before 2010. 
Table 3 
Global Comparison of Poverty and Distribution 
Cntry GDP ppp > $15 bil (2003) All Countries with Data 
% Countries % Countries 
 
Rank 
India 
No. of 
Countries Above Below Value Year 
Rank 
India 
No. of 
Countries Above Below 
Income           
  Per Capita GDP ppp 71 79 90% 10% 636 1980 107 127 84% 16% 
  Per Capita GDP ppp 80 104 77% 23% 2892 2003 111 165 67% 33% 
Income Distribution and Poverty           
  Share of Lowest 10% 4 95 4% 96% 3.9 2000* 6 127 5% 95% 
  Share of Lowest 20% 11 95 12% 88% 8.9 2000* 14 127 11% 89% 
  Share of Lowest 40% 21 95 22% 78% 21.2 2000* 25 127 20% 80% 
  Gini Index 29 95 31% 69% 32.5 2000* 32 126 25% 75% 
  Poverty: Head Count Ratio (%) 24 56 43% 57% 28.6 2000* 29 85 34% 66% 
Note:  * = Poverty and Income Distribution Data is available for different years for different countries. 
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There are only 85 (56 medium-large) countries for which a Poverty rate (Head count 
ratio) is available for any year since 1985.  Among these 85 (56) countries India’s 
poverty rate was 29th (25th) lowest i.e. it fell in the 66th (57th) percentile (Table 3).17  In 
other words India’s poverty ranking is far superior to its per capita GDP rank. This is 
partly due to (and consistent with) the fact that India has a relatively equal income 
distribution.  Among 127 countries (95 medium-large), India’s relative rank on various 
income distribution parameters is even better than its rank on poverty. 
India’s rank on the GINI co-efficient (a summary measure of inequality), is in the 
75th (69th) percentile, the share of income/consumption of the lowest 40 percent of the 
population is in the 80th (78th) percentile, the share of the lowest 20 percent is in the 89th 
(88th) percentile and that of the lowest 10 percent is in the 95th (96th) percentile.  This 
means that the poorest tenth of population have a higher share of the national pie than in 
India, in only 6 countries (5 percent of total) of which 4 are medium-large countries (4 
percent of ML).  This is a remarkable fact that the “nattering nabobs of negativism” 
choose to ignore.  This could be partly the result of the socio-political systems higher 
sensitivity to poor voters (though there is no empirical evidence). 
 
7.  HUNGER 
The FAO defines about 19 percent of the people in developing countries (828 
million) as hungry, while the proportion of Hungry in S. Asia is asserted to be about 20 
percent (254 million).  The World food programme on the other hand claims that nearly 
50 percent of the hungry in the World live in India and 35 percent (350 million) are food 
insecure.   Recall that 26.1 percent to 28.5 percent of the population has been found to be 
poor in 1999-2000, where the former is the official figure.  What are the facts about 
hunger?  NSS 38 round in 1983 as well as the NSS 50th (1993-94) and NSS 55th round 
(1999-2000) had a question on hunger that allows a direct answer to this question.18  The 
NSS questions on hunger are, (a) Do all members of your household get two square 
meal/enough food everyday, (b) If not, then during which calendar months did you or 
other members of the household not have enough food everyday? The number of months 
indicated by the household is recorded. 
The proportion of households that were hungry during any part of the year, by this 
definition (the authentic voice of the poor in India) was 15.7 percent in 1983, 4.5 percent 
in 1993-94 and 2.1 percent 1999-2000.  In terms of individuals (assuming that every 
person in the household was hungry), we estimate that the number of hungry people 
declined from 15.1 percent of total population (101 mil.) in 1983 to 4.4 percent of 
population (37 mil.) in 1993-4 and further to 2 percent of the population (18.5 mil.) in 
1999-2000.   
It is useful to look at these numbers in relation to poverty, because logically the 
number of hungry people must be a fraction (less than 100 percent) of the poor for any 
reasonable definition of poverty.  More formally the line defining the ‘very poor’ or 
‘hungry’ must logically lie below the poverty line.  Thus the hunger ratio must be lower 
that the poverty ratio.  The ratio of very poor/hungry to the poor may in general decline, 
 
17If rich countries are assumed to have 0 poverty, India falls in the 62nd (51st) percentile of medium-
large (all) countries. In 1993 the World Bank’s $1 a day poverty line was equal to the Indian poverty line. 
18Do we believe in “Voices of the Poor,” or don’t we? Is it only if it is a small selected group of poor? 
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stay constant or rise, depending on the distribution of consumption in the lower half of 
the distribution.  In 1983 an estimated 33.9 percent i.e. more that 1/3rd of the poor were 
hungry at some point in the year.  This proportion declined to 12.2 percent in 1993-94 
and further to below 7.7 percent in 1999-2000.19  Thus not only has poverty declined over 
the 1980s and 1990s, but the proportion of the poor who are hungry has also declined.  
This is precisely what we would expect given that the consumption distribution has 
consistently improved for the bottom 40 percent of the population. 
That 18.5 million people went hungry and 260 million people were still poor half a 
century after Independence is matter of great sadness for the nation.  Do we need to 
exaggerate/magnify the problem to convince ourselves of its seriousness or to gather the 
will to solve it? 
 
8.  LIFE AND LITERACY 
Only a few indicators of health and education are available on a continuous 
basis and for earlier periods.  On the health side Mortality and life expectancy data is 
available since 1960-61 and on the education side literacy data is available from the 
same date. This allows us to compare the performance of these over the two phases 
of growth and to see whether they are consistent with the data on poverty and hunger.  
It should be remembered that these indicators are (a) very strongly correlated with 
per capita income of the household. (b) The quantity and quality of public and quasi-
public goods and services have a critical influence on the basic health and education 
indicators in low income countries.  These include public health measures (control of 
communicable diseases and epidemics), public education (nutrition, personal 
hygiene, ORT), the supply of clean water, sewerage and sanitation and primary 
education.  
In Table 4 we use a ‘life expectancy gap,’ defined as follows:  The maximum 
female  life  expectancy  in  any country (which is higher than the male) is  currently 85.2 
years.  We therefore round this up to 90 and calculate the difference between this and the 
actual life expectancy in any year and call it the ‘life expectancy gap’.  Similarly we use 
the rate of illiteracy (100 – literacy rate) to calculate the pace of change.  
All the available health indicators, with one exception, show that the annual 
rate of improvement has accelerated (or remained unchanged) during phase II above 
that which prevailed during phase I.  The most significant is the pace of improvement 
in under-5 and infant mortality.  The rate of decline in infant mortality has almost 
doubled to an average of 2.5 percent per annum between 1980-81 and 2003-04.  The 
rate of decline of under-5 mortality has increased from 1.7 percent per annum 
between 1960-61 and 1980-81 to 2.8 percent per annum between 1980-81 and 2003-
04.  The female and total life expectancy gap is also closing at a faster rate in phase 
II than it was in phase I. 
The only contrary indicator is adult male mortality rate, whose improvement has 
almost come to a halt.  As the male is more likely to be employed this suggests that the 
reason may lie in his work environment rather than in his household situation (income, 
residence etc.).  This evidence is however, contradictory to that on the male life 
expectancy gap, which has continued to close at the same rate as earlier. 
 
19Using the official poverty rate gives us the upper bound on this percentage. 
Table 4 
Social Indicators during Two Phases (Per 1000, Years or % of Category) 
 Phase I: 1950-51 to 1979-80 Phase II: 1980-81 to 2003-04 
 Years Variable Change Years Variables Change 
 TI1 TI2 YI1 YI2 Gr Rt I TII1 TII2 YII1 YII2 Gr Rt I 
Health           
Mortality Rate, Under-5 (Per 1,000) 60 80 242 173 –1.7% 80 03 173 87 –2.9% 
Mortality Rate, Infant (Per 1,000 Live Births) 60 80 146 113 –1.3% 80 03 113 63 –2.5% 
Mortality Rate, Adult Female (Per 1,000 Fem Adlt) 60 80 407 279 –1.9% 80 00 279 191 –1.9% 
Mortality Rate, Adult, Male (Per 1,000 Male Adlt) 60 80 398 261 –2.1% 80 00 261 250 –0.2% 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years) Gap 62 82 45 35 –1.2% 82 03 35 27 –1.3% 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Female (Years) Gap 62 82 45 35 –1.3% 82 03 35 26 –1.5% 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Male (Years) Gap 62 82 44 35 –1.1% 82 03 35 27 –1.1% 
Education           
Illiteracy Rate, Youth Male (% of Males 15–24) 70 80 40 32 –2.1% 80 00 32 20 –2.3% 
Illiteracy Rate, Youth Total (% of People 15–24) 70 80 55 45 –2.0% 80 00 45 27 –2.4% 
Illiteracy Rate, Youth Female (% of Females 15–24) 70 80 70 58 –1.9% 80 00 58 35 –2.5% 
Illiteracy Rate, Adult Male (% of Males > 15) 70 80 53 45 –1.6% 80 00 45 32 –1.8% 
Illiteracy Rate, Adult Total (% of People > 15) 70 80 67 59 –1.3% 80 01 59 39 –2.0% 
Illiteracy, Adult Female (% of Females > 15) 70 80 81 73 –1.0% 80 00 73 55 –1.5% 
Young Illiterate Females:Males (% Ages 15–24) 70 80 1.8 1.8 0.2% 80 00 1.8 1.7 –0.1% 
Socio-economic           
Labour Force, Children 10–14 (% of Age Group) 60 80 30.1 21.4 –1.7% 80 03 21.4 10.7 –3.0% 
Fertility Rate, Total (Births per Woman) 62 82 6.5 4.8 –1.5% 82 03 4.8 2.9 –2.4% 
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On the education side, the rate of illiteracy has declined at a much faster rate in phase 
II for all categories (adults, youth, male, female).  For instance the illiteracy rate of adult 
females aged 15 and over declined at the rate of 1.5 percent per annum during 1980-81 to 
2000-01 compared a decline 1 percent per annum between 1970-71 and 1980-81.  The 
literacy gap between females and males, which was expanding during 1970-71 to 1980-81, 
has been closing for adults as well as youth during 1980-81 to 2000-01 (Table 4). 
Two general indicators which reflect the acceleration in income/consumption 
growth and social improvement are the labour force participation rate of children aged 10 
to 14 years and the total fertility rate (births per women).  The prevalence of child labour 
declined at 1.7 percent per annum between 1960-61 and 1980-81. The rate of decline has 
almost doubled to 3 percent per annum during 1980-81 to 2003-04.   The rate of decline 
of the fertility rate has similarly increased from 1.5 percent per annum over 1962-63 to 
1982-83 to 2.4 percent per annum during 1982-83 to 2003-04. 
 
9.  GOVERNANCE FAILURE: QUASI-PUBLIC GOODS  
Our relative performance in the area of basic health is broadly in line with our relative 
ranking on per capita income.  However our relative performance on education is worse than 
our relative per capita income.  The relative ranking in both is also much worse than in 
poverty and income distribution.  This set of facts suggests that the failure lies in the quantity 
and quality of Public and Quasi-Public Goods (and services) supplied by the State.  Relatively 
poor performance in basic education and to a lesser extent in public health represents a 
relative failure of governance. Despite an extensive network of government health Centres the 
poor spend a substantial fraction of their funds on health.  Much of this is, however, wasted on 
unqualified medical practitioners, Quacks and Faith healers.  The effectiveness of this 
expenditure can be increased through public education. State Governments must give much 
more attention to basic education (3R s and discipline), public education and information 
dissemination (new approaches, technology and opportunities) and public health education 
(nutrition, nature and method of spread of diseases, constraints on treatment, faith healing)  
than most have in the past, to correct these anomalies.  
Among the set of medium-large countries, India ranks around the 20th percentile 
in Life expectancy at birth, Mortality rate of infants, children under 5 and females (Table 
5).  This is only marginally lower than our ranking on per capita GDP.  India’s ranking 
on male mortality at the 31st percentile is however much better than for per capita GDP, 
but still significantly worse than for poverty (57th percentile).  India has many 
government programmes focused on Women and children’s nutrition and health. These 
have clearly not been successful in closing the large gap between adult male mortality, 
because 40 percent of staff (55 to 60 percent in PHS of poorer states) is absent 
[Chaudhury, et al. (2005)].  In addition, the relative neglect of basic public health and 
public health education is a major factor in the relatively poor level of basic health 
indicators. This is apparent from the following figure giving India’s comparative 
performance on sanitation services (arrows point to India’s data).  Figure 3 shows clearly 
that the access of our population to sanitation services is much worse than is to be 
expected at our level of per capita GDP.  Further 89 percent of the countries for which 
data is available perform better on this indicator than India.  This is rank is worse than 
our rank on the mortality indicators and life expectancy indicators (Table 5). 
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Table 5 
Global Comparison of Basic Health and Education Indicators 
% Countries  Rank  
India 
No. of 
Countries Above Below Value Year 
Health       
  Mortality Rate Male (Per 1000 Males) 75 108 69% 31% 250 2000 
  Mortality Rate Female (Per 1000 Females) 85 108 79% 21% 191 2000 
  Mortality Rate Infant (Per 1000 Infants) 84 108 78% 22% 63 2003 
  Mortality Rate Under (Per 1000 5–) 86 108 80% 20% 87 2003 
  Life Expectancy at Birth (Per 1000) 87 108 81% 19% 63 2003 
Education       
  Primary (Net) School Enrolment (%) 82 101 81% 19% 83 2000 
  Primary (Net) School Enrolment (%) 86 101 85% 15% 83 2001 
  Primary Completion Rate (%) 82 100 82% 18% 77 2000 
  Primary Completion Rate (%) 81 102 79% 21% 81 2002 
  Persistence to Grade 5 (% of Cohort) 88 92 96% 4% 61 2000 
  Labour Force with Education > Primary 69 74 93% 7% 49 1988 
  Youth (15–24) Literacy (% of Youth) 90 98 92% 8% 73 2000 
  Adult Literacy Rate (% of Adults) 100 108 93% 7% 57 2000 
  Adult Literacy Rate (% of Adults) 100 108 93% 7% 61 2001 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 CD ROM. 
 
Fig. 3. Comparative Performance of India in Sanitation and Water Supply 
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Basic education was badly neglected during the Phase of Indian socialism.  This is 
most starkly reflected in the literacy rate and the education level of the labour force.  At 
the beginning of the 21st century India ranks in the 7th-8th percentile in adult literacy, 
youth (15-24) literacy and percent of labour force with Primary or higher level of 
schooling (Table 5).  Persistence of student to the level of grade 5 (as percent of the 
cohort) is even worse with only 4 out of 92 countries having a worse performance (4th 
percentile).  The global ranking is somewhat better for Net Primary school enrolment and 
Primary school completion rates, being ranked in the 15th percentile in the former and in 
the 21st percentile in the latter.  These are, however, worse than our per capita GDP 
ranking.  
The constitution enjoined the State to provide education.  The courts interpreted 
these to create a government monopoly over Primary and Secondary education (State list) 
and degree granting colleges/universities (Central list).  The government(s) took 40 years 
to set up a network of schools, where on average 25 percent of teachers are absent from 
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school, another 25 percent are absent from the class, and 5 percent or more are just sitting 
in class. [Chaudury, et al. (2005)].  Overall the quality of teaching is abysmal, despite 
teachers getting much higher salary than in the reluctantly permitted, bureaucratically 
oppressed, non-profit schools. A government monopoly coupled with low accountability 
and poor governance is the worst possible solution to any economic or social problem.  
Our constitutionally mandated and court interpreted education system is an 
approximation of this hypothetical one.  The solution is greater accountability (via user 
groups) to those who are directly affected by this failure, namely the parents and 
grandparents of school age children.  Sustained accountability also requires the 
involvement of Panchayati Raj institutions (local level for primary, block for secondary) 
and non-government organisations.  
 
10.  POVERTY ELIMINATION 
 
10.1.  Estimated Cost 
What is the cost of eliminating poverty and hunger in India?  That of course 
depends on the extent of poverty, which is currently mired in academic debates about the 
measurement of poverty. There is however universal agreement that in the years from 
1993-94 to 1999-2000 the poverty rate (HCR) was between 25 percent and 35 percent.  
We can therefore skirt the esoteric debate about the precise change in poverty between 
1993-94 and 1999-2000 and its level in either year by considering three numbers.  For 
each of these years we order the households/person by consumption level and identify the 
ones which are 25 percent, 30 percent and 35 percent from the bottom.  That is we 
identify in each year the consumption level of the person(s) who would be just at the 
poverty line if the poverty rate was 25 percent, 30 percent and 35 percent respectively.  
Then we calculate the income transfer needed for every body below that level to be 
brought up to the level.   This data is summarised in the table below. 
 
Table 6 
Consumption Expenditures and Expenditure Gap 
 Poverty Rate (HCR) or Cut Off Line (x) 
 25% 30% 35% 50% 
Average Per Capita Expenditure (1999-2000) 
 Person at x% Line 4092 4356 4632 5532 
 Persons below x% 3273 3523 3622 4026 
 Average Gap 819 833 1010 1506 
Number below x%(Crore) 23.1 27 32 46.21 
Total GAP (Rs Crore) 18914 22478 32318 69584 
Average Per Capita Expenditure (1993-94) 
 Person at x% Line 2288 2448 2596 3102 
 Persons below x% 1810 1927 2029 2258 
 Average Gap 478 521 567 844 
Number below x%(Crore) 21.1 25 29 42 
Total GAP (Rs Crore) 10086 13016 16448 35459 
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In 1993-94 the Central government expenditure in the budget category “subsidies” 
was Rs 12,682 crore of which Rs 10,099 crore were for food and fertiliser subsidies.  The 
latter would have been enough to bring all the poor to the consumption level of the 
person/household at the 25 percent level.  During the same year the Central and State 
governments together spent another Rs 14,160 crore on the budget categories ‘Rural 
development,’ ‘Welfare of SC, ST and OBCs’ and ‘Social Security and Welfare’.  This 
expenditure would have been enough to bring all the poor to the consumption level of the 
person/household at the 30 percent level.  These two sets of expenditures (Rs 25850) 
would have been more than sufficient to eliminate poverty in 1993 if transferred directly 
to the poor and disadvantaged (SC, ST, handicapped, old, poor farmers).20 
In 1999-2000 the total subsidies provided by the Central government were Rs 
25,690 crore of which Rs 22,680 crore were for food and fertiliser.    During the same 
year the Central and State governments together spent another Rs 28,080 crore on ‘Rural 
development (RD),’ ‘Welfare of SC, ST and OBCs and ‘Social Security and Welfare’.  
Either of these was sufficient to bring all the poor to the consumption level of the 
person/household at the 30 percent level.  Given that poverty was between 26.1 percent 
and 28.6 percent either of these if transferred directly to the poor and disadvantaged (SC, 
ST, handicapped, old, poor farmers) would have eliminated poverty.  Together these 
subsidies and poverty alleviation expenditures (Rs 53,770 crore) would have been 
sufficient to eliminate poverty in 1999-2000, even if administrative costs and leakages 
used up half the allocation (and the small fraction of RD expenditures on water supply 
were excluded).   
 
10.2.  Income Transfers 
It can be argued that the ideal (most efficient) social welfare policy is a direct 
transfer of income to the poor through a negative income tax.  In a developed country 
this would be very easy.  How can we transfer these amounts directly to the poor, the 
needy and the disadvantaged in a poor country?  The answer, by setting up an Indian 
version using a modern smart card system that delivers cash and/or subsidies to the 
poor based on their entitlements as per specified parameters and norms.  Such a smart 
card could be programmed with identity (photo and biometric fingerprint), and have 
information on social (SC/ST) and personal/household characteristics.  Each person/ 
households’ entitlements could be in the form of specified subsidies (per unit subsidy 
of si for up to qi units for all i in C) for the purchase of a set of items C.  The set of 
items C could include food/cereals, kerosene, midday meals, nutrition supplements, 
drinking water, toilet/sanitation services, basic drugs, schooling (primary/ 
secondary), internet access, electricity and a host of other items reflecting the dozens 
of subsidies and programmes currently in existence.  The entitlement could be varied 
with and dependent on various economic and social handicaps such as SC-ST, age 
(infant or aged), mental handicap, physical disability, female head of household, 
lactating mother, chronic illness.   In this way all the current stakeholders, special 
interest groups and social policies could be accommodated within a single integrated 
system. 
 
20Official poverty rate was 36.1 percent in 1993. 
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These subsidies would have to be collected by the provider of the specified service 
from the government through the smart card system just as is done currently in a credit 
card system.21  Alternatively all these entitlements could be calculated and consolidated 
into a single cash value to be delivered to the beneficiary every month at his residential 
address, through the smart card system.  Though on theoretical economic grounds the 
latter may be the preferred option, the former would also yield substantial gains and 
perhaps be more feasible at this stage. 
 
10.3.  PDS Non-experiment 
If poverty could be eliminated so easily why has this not been tried before?  There 
are many reasons, but the most fundamental is illustrated by the following experience:  In 
the formulation of the tenth Plan as Advisor (Development Policy) responsible for food 
policy/PDS system the author proposed the gradual introduction of a credit/debit/smart 
card system to replace the existing PDS system characterised by enormous leakages and 
high administrative costs [see Virmani and Rajeev (2001)].  In this system the entitled 
person could obtain the specified subsidy from any participating supplier of food/cereals.  
The person would pay the supplier the difference between the market price and the unit 
subsidy, and the supplier would collect the subsidy from the government. The formal 
proposal was to carry out an experiment (as a first step) to determine its effectiveness and 
to learn about and iron out any problems that may arise. Consequently funds were 
allocated in the tenth plan for introducing it in a sample of urban areas along with the 
introduction of food stamp system in a sample of rural areas.   Not a single State 
government has agreed to undertake this experiment so far, as it has the potential of 
dramatically reducing leakages and administrative costs. 
 
10.4.  Smart Card System 
The smart card would also constitute a national identity card.  For instance the 
card could contain information on citizenship and voting eligibility (constituency for 
voting) as provided and checked by the home ministry and the election commission 
respectively.  Secrecy and confidentiality clauses would have to be built into the 
national smart card system by law.  For instance, any person who does not want to 
avail of any subsidies/entitlements from the government need not provide the 
information needed for calculating and monitoring the subsidy/entitlement.  They 
would for instance only provide the information necessary to obtain a passport and 
voter registration card.  Many agencies of government (e.g. CBEC, CBDT, and 
Home) have proposed identification cards.  There are significant economies of scale 
in having one smart card system for all citizens, with different agencies having their 
own special modules (password protected access to memory segments) within the 
card for their specialised needs.  
The setting up of a smart card system is somewhat distinct from running it even 
though there may be economies of scope.  The former is very similar to carrying out a 
(special) census in which the data gathered would be entered into a smart card.  There is 
 
21The entitled person would pay the difference between the market price and the subsidy directly to the 
private or public entity supplying the goods or services. 
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however an additional, technically challenging component, the simultaneous recording of 
a photo and a biometric fingerprint so as to minimise fraud.  The experience with a 
similar system used in SEBI MAPIN project suggests that it would be best to sub-
contract it to private parties in each State/region.   
The running of smart card system is on the other hand very much like the running 
of a credit card system.  All the credit card companies, as well as companies that provide 
back office services to credit card issuers or marketers, would be interested in competing 
to obtain the contract for the running of such a system.  As a credit card company has to 
incur a fixed cost in setting up its own credit card system, these companies may be 
willing to charge below cost if they can share the fixed costs of the public system with 
their private card systems. This could make a significant difference in the cost of 
spreading the system to the rural areas.  Cash delivery through smart card would be akin 
to a modern version of the Post and Telegraph department’s money order system, already 
operational with specialised companies that intermediate international/national 
remittances.  The cost of setting up and running a nationwide cash delivery system for the 
poor would probably be significantly less than that of a commodity related system.  The 
total steady state cost of running this system (including depreciation and return on 
capital) should be of the same order as the current credit card systems (< 10 percent). 
The identity of the households below the poverty line is not fixed from year to 
year.  The largest turnover occurs because of health shocks followed by natural disasters 
(droughts and floods) that knock people below the poverty line, while others who have 
recovered from the shock or have improved their position move above the line.  As a 
matter of abundant caution we could target the bottom half of the population for issue of 
smart cards (with complete entitlement related information).  Annual updating of 
entitlement related information could be done for those below the poverty line and those 
up to half this percentage above the line (i.e. if poverty rate, HCR, is 24 percent, cover 
poorest 36 percent). 
 
10.5.  Regulatory Authority 
An independent authority including government officials and non-government 
organisations could be set up to monitor the integrity of the Poverty Elimination System.  
This supervisory authority would ensure that private operators are running the smart card 
system in a manner needed to ensure that the subsidy reaches the poor. 
Poverty, which rose during the socialist period (1950-51 to 1979-80), has been on a 
clear down trend during the Market reform period (1980-81 to current).  The level of poverty 
in 1999-2000 is estimated to be between 26.1 percent and 28.5 percent as per the Planning 
Commission methodology.  This level of poverty is to be expected in a low income country 
like India.  Our Global poverty ranking is in fact better than our ranking by per capita income.  
Further our rank with respect to income distribution is even better, with the poorest 10 percent 
of the population having a consumption share that is the 6th highest in the world.  
 
11.  CONCLUSION 
India’s poverty ratio of around 22 percent in 1999-2000 is in line with those 
observed in countries at similar levels of per capita income.  The ratio is relatively high 
because we are relatively poor/low income i.e. with low average income.  90 percent of 
Poverty and Hunger 
    
259
the countries in the world have higher per capita (average) income than India.  The 
number of poor is very high because our population is very large, the second highest in 
the world.  Contrary to hints, illusions and allegations, the large number of poor has 
nothing to do with income distribution. Our income distribution as measured by the Gini 
co-efficient is better than 3/4th the countries of the World.  The consumption share of the 
poorest 10 percent of the population is the 6th best in the world. 
Where we have failed as a nation is in improving our basic social indicators like 
literacy and mortality rates.  Much of the failure is a legacy of the three decades of Indian 
socialism (till 1979-80).  The rate of improvement of most indicators has accelerated 
during the market period (starting 1980-81).  The gap between our level and that of 
global benchmarks is still wide and our global ranking on most of these social parameters 
remains very poor.  This is the result of government failure. Government overstretch, 
misplaced priorities and deteriorating quality (corruption) has resulted in a failure to fulfil 
the traditional, accepted functions of government like public safety and security, 
universal literacy and primary education, public health education (superstition and 
quackery), provision of drinkable water, sanitation drains and sewage facilities, public 
health (infectious and epidemic diseases), building roads and creating and disseminating  
agricultural technology.  Consequently the improvement in social indicators has not kept 
pace with economic growth and poverty decline and has led to increasing interstate 
disparities in growth and poverty. 
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